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result of the Italian campaign. It is true that occasionally some strong
discordant note issuing from the popular depths would strike the ear and
for the time mar the paeans of applause which always greet successful
power. For instance, at the Odeon one night, during the war with
Austria, I was present when the Empress Eugenie entered. The Odeon is in
the Latin Quarter, and medical and law students filled the upper tiers
of the house. As the sovereign took her seat in a box a mighty chorus
suddenly arose, and hundreds of voices sang, "Corbleu, madame, que
faites vous ici?" quoting the then popular song, "Le Sire de Franboisy."
The incident, so insulting to the poor woman, gave rise to some
disturbance; and although the boys were quieted, the Empress soon left
the theater, choking with mortification. M. Rochefort, who refers to
this incident in his memoirs, adds that as the imperial party came out,
another insult of a still more shocking character was thrown at the
Empress. This, of course, I did not witness.
Such occurrences were usually treated by the press and the government
sympathizers as emanating from youthful hot-brains, or from the lower
ranks of the people, and therefore as unworthy of attention. But those
hot-brains represented the coming thinkers of France, and the "common"
people represented its strength. On the whole, however, in 1862 the more
powerful element had rallied to and upheld the government. The court and
the army were so loud in their admiration of the profound policy of the
Emperor that those who heeded the croakings of the few clear-sighted men
composing the opposition were in the background.
It so happened that my lines had been cast among these, and it is
interesting now, in looking back upon the expressions of opinion of
those who most strenuously opposed French interference in American
affairs, to see how little even these men, wise as they were in their
generation, appreciated the true conditions prevailing in Mexico. None
seriously doubted the possibility of occupying the country and of
maintaining a French protectorate. The only point discussed was, Was it
worth while? And to this question Jules Favre, Thiers, Picard, Berryer,
Glais-Bizoin, Pelletan, and a few others emphatically said, "No!"
II. THE NEW "NAPOLEONIC IDEA"
The "Napoleonic idea," however, had not burst forth fully equipped in
all its details from the Caesarean brain in 1862. It would be unfair not
to allow it worthy antecedents and a place in the historic sequence. As
far back as 1821, when the principle of constitutional monarchy was
accepted by the Mexicans under the influence of General Iturbide, a
convention known as the "plan of Iguala" had been drawn by Generals
Iturbide and Santa Anna, and accepted by the new viceroy, O'Donoju, in
which it was agreed that the crown of Mexico should be offered first to
Ferdinand VII, and, in case of his refusal, to the Archduke Charles of
Austria, or to the Infante of Spain, Don Carlos Luis, or to Don
Francisco Paulo.
The Mexican embassy sent to Spain to offer the throne of Mexico to
Ferdinand was ill received. The king had no thought of purchasing a
crown which he regarded as his own by the recognition of the
constitutional principle which he had so long fought; and the Cortes
scorned to authorize any of the Spanish princes to accept the advances
of the Mexicans. The result of Spain's unbending policy was a rupture
which involved the loss of its richest colony.
In 1854 General Santa Anna,* then dictator or president for life, had
given full powers to Senor Gutierrez de Estrada to treat with the courts
of Paris, London, Vienna, and Madrid for the establishment of a monarchy
in Mexico under the scepter of a European prince; and Senor de Estrada,
with the consent of the French government, had offered the throne of his
country to the Duc de Montpensier, who wisely, as it proved, had
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