Definitions
A sincere vote is one with no falsified preferences or preferences
left unspecified when the election method allows them to be specified
(in addition to the preferences already specified).
One candidate is preferred over another candidate if, in a one-on-one
competition, more voters prefer the first candidate than prefer the
other candidate.
The Smith set is the smallest set of candidates such that every
member of the set is preferred to every candidate not in the set. If the
Smith set consists of only one candidate, that candidate is called "Condorcet candidate" or "Condorcet winner".
Statement of Criterion
If a majority prefers a member of the Smith set to another
candidate who is not in the Smith set, then the other candidate should
not win if that majority votes sincerely and no other voter falsifies
any preferences.
Complying Methods
Cloneproof Schwartz Sequential Dropping complies with the Generalized Strategy-Free
Criterion, while Approval voting, Cardinal Ratings, Borda count, Plurality voting, and Instant-Runoff Voting do not comply.
Commentary
GSFC generalizes the Strategy-Free criterion (SFC) to the case in
which no Condorcet candidate exists, thereby covering all
possible cases. If no Condorcet candidate exists, then a cyclical ambiguity exists among
the members of the Smith set and must be resolved. The commentary for
SFC above applies here also.
Some parts of this article are derived with permission from text at http://electionmethods.org
See Also
External Links
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