Subjectivity
[ NOTE: This page is titled "Kinds of Subjectivity" because I could not create a page titled simply "Subjectivity" without getting directed automatically to the page called "Subjects (Philosophy)." Though related, the topic "Subjects" is not the same as "Subjectivity."]
Subjectivity, a key term in philosophy of mind and consciousness studies, has at least two critical meanings:
<p> Subjectivity-1: meaning experienced interiority;
<p> Subjectivity-2: meaning private, independent, isolated experience.
<p>Subjectivity-1: In this first case, subjectivity means, essentially, an intrinsic capacity for feeling and experiencing a point of view. Contrasted with external "objects," subjectivity is interior to the entity under considerationa what-it-feels-like-from-within, or, simply a "wifl." The key notion here is experienced interiority as distinct from vacuous (i.e. without experience) external relations.
<p>A subject is constituted by internal relations, and these are felt or experienced. Without experience there could be no subjectivity (and vice versa; in fact, the two words are virtually synonymous); and experience is always internal or intrinsic to the subjectthat is to say, experience doesnt happen to a subject, it is constitutive of the subject.
<p>Subjectivity has a point of view. It takes account of, or feels, its own being. Its being is validated, felt, or known from within itselfhence it is first-personnot just from without. It cannot be fully accounted for by external, mechanical relations. A subject lives or endures through time, feeling its own continuity.
<p>In subjectivity-1, experienced interiority is not automatically self-contained within its own private domain. It is interior, but not necessarily independent or isolated. The question of whether it is self-contained or interdependent is left open: It is possible for subjectivity-1 to be either interior and shared, or interior and private.
<p>Subjectivity-2: In this second, related through restricted, sense, subjectivity means an isolated, independent, self-sufficient locus of experience. Classically, this is the Cartesian ego, wholly private, and independent of all reality external to it. In this Cartesian meaning of subjectivity, the subject is not only interior, it is self-contained and private. Such independent egos, or subjects Leibniz called them monads can communicate only via mediating signals, whereas subjectivity-1 can communicate by participating "nonlocally" in shared presence. With subjectivity-1, interiority or feeling can be intersubjective and precede individual subjects; in subjectivity-2, interiority is always private, and intersubjectivity, if it occurs, is always secondary.
Further Reading
- de Quincey, C. (2002), Radical Nature: Rediscovering the Soul of Matter. Montpelier, VT: Invisible Cities Press.
- de Quincey, C. (2005-in press), Radical Knowing: Exploring Consciousness through Relationship. Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions International.
|