Maneuver warfare is a concept of warfare that advocates attempting to defeat an adversary by incapacitating their decision-making through shock and disruption. Its concepts are reflected in a number of military strategies throughout history.

Methods of war stand on a continuum between maneuver warfare and attrition warfare, the focus on achieving victory through killing or capturing an adversary. These two apparent opposites are identified as complementary by military writers. Maneuver warfare concepts have historically been stressed by militaries which are more smaller, more cohesive, better trained, or more technically able than attrition warfare counterparts.

The idea of using rapid movement to keep an enemy off-balance is almost as old as war itself. With development of cavalry and mechanized vehicles, maneuver warfare came to play an increasingly important role on the battlefields.

Contents

1 Concepts 2 History and implementation 3 See also 4 References

Concepts

With some exceptions, battles between established armies have historically been fought in a methodical or attrition-based manner. Methodical battles involve moving masses of men and materiel against equally organised enemy strongpoints, with the emphasis on the physical aspects of combat--success as measured by enemy troops killed, enemy equipment and infrastructure destroyed, and enemy territory taken and/or occupied. Methodical battle tends to utilize rigidly centralised command structures that require little or no creativity or initiative from lower-level leadership (also called top-down or 'command push' tactics). The semi-static, large scale battles of the American Civil War (with the exception of Vicksburg), Napoleonic wars, and World War I are classic examples of methodical warfare.

Maneuver warfare is the opposite of methodical warfare. Maneuver warfare advocates that the defeat of an opposing force is not necessarily accomplished by simply contacting and destroying enemy forces until they can no longer fight. Instead, the destruction of key enemy targets (command and control centers, logistical bases, fire support assets, etc.) is combined with isolation of enemy strongpoints and exploitation of enemy weaknesses. Bypassing and cutting off enemy strongpoints often results in the collapse of that strong point even if the physical destruction is minimal. Firepower, which is used primarily to destroy as many enemy forces as possible in methodical battle, is primarily used to suppress enemy positions at breakthrough points during maneuver warfare. Infiltration tactics by conventional or special operation forces may be used extensively to cause chaos and confusion behind fixed enemy lines.

Since tempo and intiative are so critical to the success of maneuver warfare, command structures tend to be more decentralised, with more tactical freedom given to lower-level unit leaders. This decentralised command structure allows 'on the ground' unit leaders, while still working within the guidelines of commander's overall vision, to exploit enemy weaknesses as they become evident (also called 'recon-pull' tactics).

History and implementation

For the majority of history armies were limited in their speed to that of the marching soldier, about equal for everyone involved. This meant that it was possible for opposing armies to simply march around each other as long as they wished, with supply conditions often deciding where and when the battle would finally be fought. Perhaps the most famous example of this ended with the Battle of Agincourt in 1415, prior to which Henry V of England avoided combat while marching to Calais to resupply, allowing him to pick the battlefield.

This begun to change with the domestication of the horse, the invention of chariots and the increasing military use of the cavalry from approximately 2nd century AD. The next major step would be Napoleon's improvement of logistics, which changed the nature of warfare considerably. Now the invading army was not under the same sort of timing pressure to bring the opposition to battle as soon as possible. This allowed his forces to attack where and when they wanted, often giving him the advantage of terrain. It also allowed him to form much larger armies because they were no longer straining the local economies directly.

The next step major revolution in the concept of maneuver warfare would come as a result of the introduction of various forms of mechanized transport, starting with the steam powered trains in mid-19th century. Logistics have been vastly improved and the opposing armies were no longer limited in speed. A war of maneuver became a real possibility. Some train-borne manoeuvring took place during the American Civil War in the 1860s, but the sizes of the armies involved meant the system could provide only limited support. Armoured trains were among the first armoured fighting vehicles employed by mankind.

In the Franco-Prussian War the Prussian army, knowing that the French could field larger forces, devised a war plan that relied on speed. If, on declaration of war, they could mobilise, invade and seize Paris fast enough, then they would be victorious before the vast French army could form and retaliate. This tactic was used to devastating effect in 1871, when the Prussian forces were able to defeat two large French forces before they were able to join in the field.

Given the success they had in 1870s, it's not surprising that the German battle plan for the First World War would be similar. German attempted to repeat the "knock-out blow" against Paris in the Schlieffen Plan. However technology had changed considerably in the four decades, with the machine gun and considerably more powerful artillery swinging the balance of power decisively to the defense. While all combatants were desperate to get the front moving again, this proved difficult. The introduction of the tank in a series of increasingly successful operations pointed the way out of trench warfare, but the war ended before the British plans to field thousands of them could be put into place. Germany introduced infiltration and stormtrooper tactics toward the end of World War I, which bypassed resistance to reduce it through indirect means.

During the Second World War, Germany pursued its strategy of blitzkrieg, or "lightning war", perhaps the most famous example of maneuver warfare. The Soviets had developed the concept of "Deep Battle", which they continued through the Cold War. The Western Allies were strategically attrition-oriented, though maneuver-minded commanders included Montgomery and Patton.

The possibility of a massive Soviet offensive in Western Europe led to the creation of the United States Army's AirLand battle doctrine. Though far from focusing on maneuver, it emphasised using combined arms to disrupt an adversary's plans by striking through their depth.

The military doctrine of Rapid Dominance or Shock and awe is a form of maneuver warfare. Shock and awe emphasizes high amounts of communication and rapid strikes using combined arms to create confusion in the enemy. It relies heavily on air power, large amounts of central coordination, and focuses on destroying the enemy's command and control structures rather than its supply lines. Implementing this doctrine in the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, overwhelming U.S. mobility and firepower allowed a (relatively) small number of U.S. forces to categorically defeat a much larger opposing force which was fighting from fixed strongpoints. The drive to Baghdad was characterized not so much by the destruction of Iraqi forces as by U.S. forces swarming around and past known enemy strongpoints and capturing key cities, transportation assests, and other centers of tactical importance. The isolation of these strongpoints resulted in massive numbers of Iraqi troops surrendering rather than being killed, a result that was also seen during the 1991 defeat of Iraqi forces during the liberation of Kuwait by coalition forces.

See also

• Combined arms
• Decision cycle
• OODA Loop
• Operational tempo

References

• Boyd, John. Patterns of Conflict. 1986. Available online (http://www.d-n-i.net/boyd/pdf/poc.pdf), accessed 5 February 2005.
• Simpkin, Richard E. Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare. Brassey's, 2000.