- The title given to this article is incorrect due to technical limitations. The correct title is Nicolae Ceauşescu.
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The remaining issues are in the section Coup.
Nicolae Andruţă Ceauşescu [nik-oh-LA-ye ahnd-RU-tsuh cha-ow-SHESS-koo] (January 26, 1918 - December 25,1989) was the leader of Communist Romania from 1965 until shortly before his execution in 1989.
Early life and career
Born in the Scorniceşti village of the Olt county, Ceauşescu moved to Bucharest at the age of 11 to become a shoemaker's apprentice.
He joined the illegal Communist Party of Romania in early 1932 and was first arrested in 1933 for agitating during a strike. He was arrested again in 1934 first for collecting signatures on a petition protesting the trial of railway workers and twice more for other similar activities earning him the description "dangerous communist agitator" and "active distributor of communist and anti-fascist propaganda" on his police record. He then went underground but was captured and imprisoned in 1936 for a two year sentence at Doftana Prison for anti-fascist activities.
While out of jail in 1939 he met Elena Petrescu (they married in 1946) - she would play a growing role in his political life over the decades. He was arrested and imprisoned again in 1940. In 1943 he was transferred to Târgu Jiu concentration camp where he shared a cell with Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, becoming his protégé. After World War II, when Romania was beginning to fall under Soviet influence, he served as secretary of the Union of Communist Youth (1944-1945).
After the Communists seized power in Romania in 1947, he headed the ministry of agriculture, then served as deputy minister of the armed forces under Gheorghiu-Dej's Stalinist reign. In 1952 Gheorghiu-Dej brought him onto the Central Committee months after the party's "Muscovite faction" led by Ana Pauker had been purged. In 1954 he became a full member of the Politburo and eventually rose to occupy the second highest position in the party hierarchy.
Leadership of Romania
Three days after the death of Gheorghiu-Dej in March 1965, Ceauşescu became first secretary of the Romanian Workers' Party. One of his first acts was to rename the party the Romanian Communist Party and declare that the country was now the Socialist Republic of Romania rather than a People's Republic. In 1967 he consolidated his power by becoming president of the State Council. Initially, he was a popular figure, due to his independent policy, challenging the supremacy of the Soviet Union in Romania. In the 1960s he ended Romania's active participation in the Warsaw Pact (though Romania formally remained a member); he refused to take part in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces, and actively condemned that action.
 Propaganda painting of the Ceausescus In 1974, Ceauşescu added "President of Romania" to his titles, further consolidating his power. He followed an independent policy in foreign relations—for example, in 1984, Romania was one of only two Communist-ruled countries to take part in the American-organized 1984 Summer Olympics. Also, the country was the first of the Eastern Bloc to have official relations with the European Community: an agreement including Romania in the Community's Generalized System of Preferences was signed in 1974 and an Agreement on Industrial Products was signed in 1980. However, Ceauşescu refused to implement any liberal reforms. The evolution of his regime followed the Stalinist path already traced by Gheorghiu-Dej. Their opposition to Soviet control was mainly determined by the unwillingness to proceed to destalinization. The secret police (Securitate) maintained firm control over speech and the media, and tolerated no internal opposition.
Ceauşescu had made state visits to the People's Republic of China and North Korea in 1971. He took great interest in the idea of total national transformation as embodied in the programs of the Korean Workers' Party and China's Cultural Revolution. Shortly after returning home he began to emulate North Korea's dictatorship, influenced by the Juche philosophy of North Korean President Kim Il Sung. Korean books on Juche were translated into Romanian and widely distributed in the country.
Beginning in 1972, Ceauşescu instituted a program of systematization. Promoted as a way to build a "multilaterally developed socialist society," the program of demolition, resettlement, and construction began in the countryside, but culminated with an attempt to completely remodel the country's capital. Over one fifth of central Bucharest, including churches and historic buildings, was demolished during Ceauşescu's rule in the 1980s, in order to rebuild the city in his own style. The The People's House ("Casa Poporului") in Bucharest, now the Parliament House, is one of the world's largest buildings, after The Pentagon. Ceauşescu also planned to bulldoze many villages in order to move the peasants into blocks of flats in the cities, as part of his "urbanization" and "industrialization" programs. An NGO project called "Sister Villages" that created bonds between European and Romanian communities may have played a role in hindering these plans.
The Pacepa Defection
In 1978 Ion Mihai Pacepa, a senior member of the Romanian intelligence service (Securitate), defected to the United States. According to the official declaration made by president Ion Iliescu when Pacepa asked his properties and position back, Pacepa was "a confused man" who gathered illegal properties in Romania by using his influential position. His treason was a powerful blow against the regime, forcing Ceauşescu to overhaul the architecture of the Securitate. Pacepa's 1986 book Red Horizons: Chronicles of a Communist Spy Chief (ISBN 0895265702) reveals details of Ceauşescu's regime such as his collaboration with Arab terrorists, his massive espionage on American industry and his elaborate efforts to rally Western political support. After Pacepa's defection, the country became more isolated and the economic growth stopped. Ceauşescu's intelligence agency started to be heavily infiltrated by foreign intelligence agents and he started to lose control of the country. He tried several reorganizations in a bid to get rid of old collaborators of Pacepa, but this was unsuccessful.
Personality Cult and Authoritarianism
 Casa Poporului ("People's House"), now Casa Parliamentului ("House of Parliament") Like Kim in North Korea, Ceauşescu created a pervasive personality cult, giving himself the titles of "Conducător" ("Leader") and "Geniul din Carpaţi" ("Genius of the Carpathians") and even having a king-like scepter made for himself. Such excesses prompted the painter Salvador Dalí to send a congratulatory telegram to the "Conducator." The Communist Party daily Scînteia published the message, unaware that Dalí had written it with tongue firmly in cheek. To avoid new treasons after the one of Pacepa, Ceauşescu also invested his wife Elena and other members of his family with important positions in the government.
Ceauşescu's Statesmanship
Under Ceauşescu, Romania was Europe's fourth biggest exporter of weapons. Nevertheless, several of Ceauşescu's actions suggest that one of his ambitions was to win a Nobel Prize for peace. In this direction he tried to be a mediator between PLO and Israel. He organized a successful referendum for reducing the size of the Romanian Army by 5%. He held large rallies for peace and wrote a poem that was part of each literature manual. His poem was (in a word for word translation):
- Let us make from cannons tractors
- From atom lights and sources
- From nuclear missiles
- Plows to labour fields.
Ceauşescu also tried to play the role of a father to poor African countries. He was one of the friends of Mobutu Sese Seko of Congo, sending them money and technology, and used to be acclaimed as a hero by the people of these countries when he was visiting them.
Foreign debt
Despite his increasingly totalitarian rule, Ceauşescu's political independence from the Soviet Union drew the interest of western powers. Ceauşescu was able to borrow heavily from the west to finance economic development programs, but these loans ultimately devastated the country's financial position. Ceauşescu decided that this was not a good idea and wanted to pay Romania's debts. He organized a referendum and managed to change the constitution, adding a clause stating that Romania would be forbidden to take debts again.
In the 1980s, Ceauşescu ordered the export of much of the country's agricultural and industrial production in order to repay its debts. The resulting domestic shortages made the everyday life of Romanian citizens a fight for survival as food rationing was introduced and heating, gas and electricity black-outs were becoming habit. The standard of living (and especially the availability of food and general goods in shops) slowly decreased between 1980 and 1989. The official explanation was that the country was paying her debts, and people accepted the suffering, believing it to be for a short time only and for the ultimate good.
The debt was fully paid in summer 1989, shortly before Ceauşescu was overthrown. People were very happy when in summer 1989 Ceauşescu announced that all debts were paid, expecting that the situation would improve. An improvement of the situation was indeed claimed on the TV where Ceauşescu was shown entering well stocked shops.
The constitutional prohibition of debt was the first thing that was changed, without any referendum, by the leaders of the FSN when they came to power after the December 1989 revolution.
Leadership weaknesses
Ceauşescu's social policies further aggravated the situation. For instance, it became national policy to forcibly maintain the population growth rate. A key element of this was the 1966 decree that prohibited abortion and contraception and made divorce more difficult to obtain. Mothers of at least 5 children would have received significant benefits, while mothers of at least 10 children were declared heroic mothers receiving a gold medal, a free ARO 4x4 car, free transportation on trains, and a free holiday travel each year to a resort. However, this was only on paper, since no Romanian woman acquired such "heroic mother" status, the average Romanian family having 2-3 children (see Demographics of Romania).
While the population growth rate was maintained, poverty and poor sexual education led to thousands of children abandoned at state-run orphanages by their families (many were undesired children abandoned at birth, or because poor parents could not support them). These institutionalized "decree babies" lived in squalid conditions that caused many deaths. Another disastrous policy was Ceauşescu's refusal to acknowledge the presence of AIDS in the population. He forbade testing of the blood supply; because of this and because Romania allowed the use of shared needles in transfusions for orphans, Romania had over half the cases of childhood AIDS infections in Europe.
In 1987 an attempted strike at Braşov failed: the army occupied the factories and crushed the workers' demonstrations.
During 1989, Ceauşescu became even more isolated in the Communist world: he proposed in August 1989 a summit to discuss the problems of Eastern European Communism and "defend socialism" in these countries, but his proposal was turned down by the Warsaw Pact states and China.
Tensions Grow
In 1989 Ceauşescu was giving signs that he was completely isolated from the reality in the country. The country was undergoing difficult times with long queues for food and empty shops. He was often shown on TV entering shops that were full with food and declaring that the people were living well. In Fall 1989, there were TV transmissions during several hours per day showing scrolling lists with uncountable CAPs (kolhozs) where there would have been a record harvest in century. People were told that Romania was experiencing her greatest wealth ever. This was in sharp contrast to the experience of the average Romanian at the time.
Instead, in many places in the country the electricity was cut each time he was giving a speech, completely disconnecting the people from what was happening.
Some people, believing that Ceauşescu did not know what was happening in the country, tried to hand him letters when he was visiting the country. However, each time he was getting a letter he was seen passing it to his security advisers, and nobody knew whether he ever got to really know their content. Worse, there were rumors all over saying that people handing letters directly to Ceauşescu would be punished by the Securitate. People were strongly discouraged from addressing him and there was a general feeling that things could not get worse. People were divided on whether he pretended not to know the reality of the shops, or he was really unaware and cheated by his informers. The subsequent data seems to support the latter supposition.
Revolution
See main article Romanian Revolution of 1989.
Ceauşescu's regime collapsed after a series of violent events in Timişoara and Bucharest in December 1989.
In November 1989 the XIVth Congress of PCR (Romanian Communist Party) saw Ceauşescu, now aged 72, reelected for another 5 years as leader of PCR.
Demonstrations in the city of Timişoara were triggered by the government-sponsored attempt to evict Laszlo Tokes, an ethnic Hungarian church minister, accused by the government of inciting ethnic hate. Members of his ethnic Hungarian congregation surrounded his apartment in a show of support. Romanian students spontaneously joined the demonstration, which soon lost nearly all connection to its initial cause and became a more general anti-government demonstration. Regular military forces, police and Securitate fired on demonstrators on December 17, 1989.
On December 18, 1989, Ceauşescu departed for a visit to Iran, leaving the duty of quashing the Timişoara revolt to his subalterns and his wife. On his return on the evening of December 20, the situation was even worse, and he held a televised speech from the TV studio inside Central Committee Building (CC Building), in which he spoke about Timişoara in terms of an "interference of foreign forces in Romania's internal affairs" and an "external aggression on Romania's sovereignty". The country, which had no information of the Timişoara events from the national media, heard about the Timişoara revolt from western radio stations like Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, and by word of mouth. A mass meeting was staged for the next day, December 21, which would represent a "spontaneous movement of support for Ceauşescu", emulating the 1968 meeting in which Ceauşescu had spoken against the invasion of Czechoslovakia by forces of Warsaw Pact.
On December 21, the mass meeting, held in what is now Revolution Square, degenerated into anarchy, a stunned Ceauşescu couple failing to control the crowds, finally hiding inside the CC Building, where they remained until the next day. The rest of the day saw a revolt of the Bucharest population, who had assembled in University Square, and confronted the police and the army on barricades, these events being regarded as the genuine revolution. However, the unarmed rioters were no match for the military apparatus concentrated in Bucharest, which cleared the streets by midnight, hundreds of people being arrested.
National television interrupted the broadcast the previous day, but the country had seen Ceauşescu's senile reaction to the events. The rebellion spread in all major cities by the morning of December 22. Vasile Milea, the minister of the army, was announced dead by the media. Ceauşescu presided over the CPEX council early in the morning and took the leadership of the army. He made an attempt to address the crowd gathered in front of the CC, but was rejected with disapproval by the rioters, who forced the doors of the building, by now left unprotected by the army, police and Securitate. The Ceauşescu couple fled by helicopter from the top of the CC building at 12 noon.
Coup
A group of conspiring generals in the Securitate used the opportunity to launch a coup in Bucharest. The coup, prepared since 1982, was originally planned for the New Year feasts, but was spontaneously replanned to take advantage of the political climate. The plot leaders, generals Stănculescu and Neagoe, were Ceauşescu's closest security advisors and convinced him to hold a mass rally in a Square that was prepared with remotely controlled automatic guns. During Ceauşescu's speech, the remotely controlled automatic guns were set to fire randomly over the crowd and agitators started to cry in loud-speakers against Ceauşescu. Scared, the people first tried to run away. Being told with loud-speakers that the Ceauşescu's repressive Securitate would be firing on them and that a "revolution" was going on, the people were convinced to join the "revolution". This turned into a protest demonstration.
On December 22 the army was without a leader, since Ceauşescu (the official chief of the army) had disappeared, being sent by his conspiring advisor (Stănculescu) to the countryside, and since the minister of Defence Vasile Milea was dead (initially the "revolution" leaders claimed that Milea was assasinated by Ceauşescu, but might have equally been killed by the plot under the guise of a suicide because he might have refused to join them). Confused, the army officers decided to avoid conflicts by declaring that they would fraternize with the demonstrators (at least these were the orders and explanations they gave to soldiers at the sites of the major events in Bucharest). More details at Romanian Revolution of 1989.
Fierce fights occurred at that moment at Bucharest Otopeni International Airport between troops sent one against another under claims that they were going to meet terrorists. In a case discussed on Romanian TV in 1989, a garrison of Securitate-affiliated soldiers (they were draftees in 1.5 year service related to Securitate) claimed that they received orders to go and defend a city against Ceauşescu's terrorists (that were believed at that time to be a disobedient faction of the Securitate, since the Securitate openly fraternized with the revolution), while in the city it was announced that the Securitate soldiers were coming to attack the regular garrison. Hundreds of people volunteered to fight against the expected Securitate. In that particular case, the chief of the Securitate garrison felt that something was wrong and refused to enter the city. According to Colonel Dumitru Burlan's book, the generals that were part of the conspiracy (led by general Victor Stănculescu) tried to create such fictional terrorists to instigate fear and to draw the army onto the side of the plot.
The motivation of the coup, as can be inferred from facts, seems complex. The first law abolished (without any referendum or legality) by the incoming leadership was the constitution article that forbade external debts. By that time the debts have been fully paid, making it more complex to trace the beneficiaries of these new desired debts: people, corrupt politicians, or international banks. Personal interests were also served, like with KGB in Russia. Namely, the Securitate people in the coup distributed between themselves most of the Romanian industry (300 hundred Romanian persons, many "revolution" and political leaders, now own a wealth comparable to the whole romanian national gross product). Some participants (probably the citation refers to Iliescu) were simply envious on Ceausescu's fame.
The End of Ceauşescu
A Romanian holds a book with the portrait of the late Nicolae Ceauşescu at his grave in a Bucharest cemetery on January 26, 2005 to mark his eighty-seventh birthday. Every year, Romanians nostalgic for the Ceauşescu years gather to mourn him at this cemetery. Ceauşescu and his wife Elena fled the capital by helicopter together with Emil Bobu and Manea Manescu. They headed for Ceauşescu's Snagov residence, from where they fled again, this time for Târgovişte. The presidential couple continued fleeing through the countryside more or less aimlessly. Near Târgovişte they abandoned the helicopter, which was ordered to land by the army, the army having interdicted all use of Romanian airspace. The flight included grotesque episodes: a car chase to evade citizens attempting an arrest, the desertion of the aides, a short stay in a school. The Ceauşescus were finally held in a police car for several hours, while the policemen listened to the radio, presumably in order to understand which political faction was about to win. Police eventually turned the presidential couple over to the army. On December 25, the two were condemned to death by a military kangaroo court on charges ranging from illegal gathering of wealth to genocide, and were executed by firing squad in Târgovişte. During their trial and before the firing squad the couple recited from the Internationale song. They were fired on after they sang the 4th word.
The firing squad was not well-prepared for the execution. One of the guards accidently shot Ceauşescu in the foot before then firing the fatal shot.
Other
The Ceauşescus had one adopted son, Valentin Ceauşescu (he was adopted to give a personal example of how people should take care of orphans, a big problem in Romania), a daughter Zoia Ceauşescu (born 1950) and a younger son, Nicu Ceauşescu (born 1951).
Ceauşescu's official annual salary was 18000 lei (equivalent to 3,000 U.S. dollars at the official exchange rate). Of this, some 5000 lei per month was banked for his children. Nevertheless, he used to receive presents (e.g, a golden plated door handle) from countries and organization that he was visiting, the misappropriation of which was one of the accusations against him at his trial. While he tried to keep account of his finances, his biological son Nicu was much less restrained and rumors abounded that he paid a gambling debt incurred in Las Vegas with a herd of horses belonging to the Communist Party.
Ceauşescu's guard was relatively small compared to that of the current Romanian government, numbering only 40 people for his residences and for his whole family. The chief of this guard was Col. Dumitru Burlan who claims that his troops had only 2 guns (insufficient for any serious defence). Col. Burlan claims that Ceauşescu was too confident that the Romanian people loved him, and believed that he did not need a defence. This explains much of the ease with which Ceauşescu was deposed and captured.
Bibliography
- Stevens W. Sowards, Twenty-Five Lectures on Modern Balkan History (The Balkans in the Age of Nationalism) (http://www.lib.msu.edu/sowards/balkan/), 1996, in particular Lecture 24: The failure of Balkan Communism and the causes of the Revolutions of 1989 (http://www.lib.msu.edu/sowards/balkan/lect24.htm)
- Edward Behr, Kiss the Hand you Cannot Bite, ISBN 0679401288
- John Sweeney, The Life and Evil Times of Nicolae Ceauşescu, ISBN 0091746728
- Dumitru Burlan, Dupa 14 ani - Sosia lui Ceauşescu se destăinuie ("After 14 Years - The Double of Ceauşescu confesses"). Editura Ergorom. July 31, 2003 (in Romanian).
- Viorel Patrichi, "Eu am fost sosia lui Nicolae Ceauşescu (http://www.lumeam.ro/nr12_2001/politica_si_servicii_secrete.html)" ("I was Ceauşescu's double") , Lumea Magazin Nr 12, 2001 (in Romanian)
- Marian Oprea, "Au trecut 15 ani -- Conspiratia Securitatii" ("After 15 years -- the conspiracy of Securitate"), in Lumea Magazin Nr 10, 2004 (http://www.lumeam.ro/nr10_2004/index.html): (in Romanian; link leads to table of contents, verifying that the article exists, but the article itself is not online).
- Victor Stănculescu, "Nu vă fie milă, au 2 miliarde de lei in cont" (http://www.jurnalul.ro/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=14985) ("Do not have mercy, they have 2 billion lei [33 million dollars]"), in Jurnalul National, Nov 22, 2004
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