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Shock and awe is a military doctrine similar to the guerilla Terror doctrine that calls for attempting to directly influence your adversary's will, perception, and understanding of events by inducing a state of shock and awe. It is not intended to replace the traditional military aim of destroying the adversary's military capability, but instead to integrate that destruction into a larger suite of actions intended to produce the psychological effect of "breaking the enemy's will to fight". The term was popularized by the United States in its 2003 invasion of Iraq, although a doctrine similar to shock and awe was employed by the German armies in World War II under the name blitzkrieg. Opinion as to the success of shock and awe in Iraq remains divided as of 2004.
The expectation that most Iraqi forces would capitulate after the shock and awe campaign appeared to have been validated when, during the third week of the invasion, coalition forces found that initial stiff resistance from irregular infantry units in many cities of southern Iraq melted away into a complete collapse of overt organized Iraqi resistance. However, it seems that the resistance merely re-formed in a decentralized, guerrilla style that exhibited increasing sophistication and coordination as time went on. Cleric Muqtada al-Sadr also organized a resistance militia known as the Mahdi Army. A military-historical consensus on the effectiveness of "shock and awe" tactics is thus not likely to be achieved until later, when Iraqi soldiers and officers can be interviewed and the impact of America's fighting doctrine on their actions be better ascertained.
Doctrine of Rapid Dominance
The first detailed description of this doctrine was in Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance, a book written by Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, and published by the National Defense University in 1996.
In the closing days of the twentieth century American military planners believed that the US had practical military supremacy over any potential adversary. Looking ahead, however, it was believed that the military would be required to maintain the same level of supremacy with fewer resources, greater constraints, and an increased tempo of operations. The concept of Rapid Dominance was proposed as one way to achieve these goals.
The aim of Rapid Dominance is to reduce an adversary's understanding, ability, and will to respond to an attack; to create sufficient "shock and awe" to render the enemy impotent. Methods of inducing "shock and awe" can include direct force applied to command and control centers, selective denial of information and dissemination of disinformation, overwhelming combat force, and rapidity of action. The development of precision guided munitions is one enabling technology for the doctrine of Rapid Dominance.
"Shock and awe" in the 2003 invasion of Iraq
Shock and Awe has been referred to as the official strategy of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and was widely talked about in the press in the weeks leading up to the opening of action. During this time the concept of shock and awe was not well explained by the press, which generally described it as simply being a larger version of the air campaign carried out in the 1991 Gulf War.
The campaign was, in keeping with the doctrine, aimed almost entirely at a limited set of command and control targets, a number of them in downtown Baghdad. When the air campaign opened these targets were all hit within a period of about 15 minutes, and follow-up raids have continued around the clock. In particular, key members of the Iraqi leadership were targeted, leading to speculation about the possible death of Saddam Hussein.
Although American officials had announced for weeks in advance of the invasion that they intended an unprecedented bombing campaign, the actual campaign seemed restrained to many observers. In addition, the selection of targets in 2003 was much more limited than in Desert Storm, and many economic targets, most notably communication, electricity, and other infrastructure, were initially spared.
Some military analysts questioned the ability of the United States to carry out a program of shock and awe by pointing out that Baghdad has extensive batteries of surface-to-air missiles which limit the ability of aircraft to stay near Baghdad, and has been in extensive contact with Serbia to gain information on how to resist an American air attack. The first night of targeted bombing of Baghdad cast doubt on the validity of this claim.
Thus far, the United States has attempted to resolve the contradiction between psychological impact on the enemy and PR impact at home by primarily targeting the symbols of the power of the Iraqi regime and by using third generation "smart bombs" when those targets are close to civilian structures. However, it has been pointed out that this strategy allowed the Iraqis to avoid military damage by basing military assets in civilian areas.
The Iraqi regime claimed that two civilians were killed and about 200 injured in the massive March 22 attack on Baghdad. The electrical, sewer, water and other public infrastructure of the city were still functional after this attack. This was intended to prevent a humanitarian crisis within Baghdad in which the sanitation system breaks down before the city is taken. Later in the war, the electricity supply to much of the city was knocked out. Also, after initially sparing it, the United States attacked Iraqi state television after it broadcast pictures of American prisoners of war.
The United States claimed that the attacks greatly interfered with the Iraqi ability to command and control troops. The complete collapse of Iraqi forces during the third week of the invasion, plus the lack of serious resistance preceding the fall of Baghdad lends ostensible credence to this view. More compelling support is found in a preliminary interview[1] (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A42721-2003Apr26.html) of Iraqi soldiers in an April 27 article from the Washington Post. Specifically:
- the accuracy and ubiquity of coalition bombing adversely impacted Iraqi morale: "This affected the morale of the soldiers, because they were hiding and thought nobody could find them. Some soldiers left their positions and ran away... Most of the commanders were sure it was through spies, because it was impossible to find through satellite or aircraft." And: "This affected the morale of the troops. The Iraqi will to fight was broken outside Baghdad."
- the "thunder run" of U.S. tanks through southern Baghdad after the U.S capture of Saddam International Airport had its intended psychological effect: "It was a very big shock. Everyone was surprised that a military force could pass through all the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard forces surrounding the presidential palaces, and everyone became afraid."
- the Iraqi army's command and control structures were effectively targeted: "In the end, when U.S. troops entered Baghdad, everything was messed up. There were no orders. We didn't know where the commanders went. We didn't know what to do. So everyone just went home."
Criticism
The doctrine is based on the concept of robbing an enemy of the ability to properly conduct an organized battle. It is not clear that this improves the situation in many instances, as US military force is already dominant to the point that organized defensive maneuvering is likely to simply present its air power with more targets in the open.
Many of the criticisms against the doctrine have been based on an incorrect understanding of the doctrine. It has repeatedly been equated with either a larger and more concentrated general air campaign similar to the one in the Gulf War, or alternately any fast-moving tactics like the Blitzkrieg.
The most significant criticism against the concept is the high tendency for civilians and civilian structures to become targets in the effort to "break the enemy's will," an unnecessary set of actions in an era of precision weaponry. Such actions may in fact be counterproductive, inspiring anger against the invading force from the people on the ground.
Historical precedents
Blitzkrieg
Some have compared the doctrine of "Rapid Dominance" with the doctrine of blitzkrieg, first widely used in World War II. There are similarities in terms of the tempo of actions and the desired psychological effect of elimination of the enemy's will to resist, but key differences in the specific ways these ends are achieved.
Both strategies attempt to confuse the enemy fighting force to the point of inaction, and both rely heavily on excellent communications to achieve close coordination of disparate forces and precise targeting of specific tactical goals. Both seek to cut the enemy fighters off from their commanders. The commanders themselves are targeted in shock and awe; supply and communications lines are targeted in blitzkrieg.
Blitzkrieg is based on the idea of massing the entirety of an army's mobile forces at a single point in front of the enemy. Aircraft then bomb key targets to destroy troop concentrations and spread panic. The massed ground forces could break through enemy lines due to local superiority, and then run to the rear areas to destroy logistics units and cut off the front lines from resupply and information. Executed properly, a blitzkrieg will happen so fast that the enemy will have little idea what is going on. Attempts to set up a coherent defense or counterattack are difficult to organize — by the time one is ready, the battle is already behind you.
Rapid Dominance, on the other hand, is based on a direct and furious attack on the command headquarters, both at the armed forces central commands and at the unit headquarters closer to the front. The aim is to cut the troops off from information and command by destroying the commanders, rather than by destroying the communications lines between commanders and troops, as in blitzkrieg. With Rapid Dominance, the focus is in the air, hundreds of kilometres from the enemy front lines; in blitzkrieg, the battle is at and just behind the enemy front lines on the ground.
The capitulation of Japan
The magnitude of "shock and awe" that the Rapid Dominance doctrine seeks to impose is the (non-nuclear) equivalent of the impact that some claim the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese at the end of World War II, which remain controversial.
Carpet bombing / Strategic bombing
Some critics have even accused the Shock and Awe strategy of being a repackaging of carpet bombing. Carpet bombing deliberately targets dispersed targets with massive numbers of "dumb" bombs, and is effectively a long distance artillery. World War II Allied policy was to deliberately target civilian centers in order to destroy homes, thereby reducing Germany's industrial output as workers were displaced.
Rapid Dominance is not similar to carpet bombing. It has very specific targets, ones that are attacked with precision guided weapons. Other military analysts find the comparison of modern precision weapons to the indiscriminate high-altitude bombing of sixty years ago to be absurd, and ridicule the idea that the US would have any problem establishing air superiority.
Comparison with the Air-Land Doctrine of the 1991 Gulf War
There has also been confusion between the doctrine of shock and awe and the doctrine of air-land battle used in the 1991 Gulf War. In contrast to shock and awe, in air-land battle, the focus of the bombing are command and control units rather than supply lines and military units deep in the rear. Furthermore, air-land battle focuses on destroying military units and supply rather than shocking them psychologically. Finally, air-land doctrine involves a long period of bombing rather than a short period as with shock and awe.
Popular culture
Following the United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003, the term "shock and awe" has been used for commercial purposes. The United States Patent and Trademark Office received at least 28 applications using "shock and awe." The first came from a fireworks company on the day the United States started bombing Baghdad. Manufacturers of video games Midway Games and Sony have attempted to use "shock and awe" in titles, but met criticism. Miscellaneous uses of the term include golf equipment and an insecticide.
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