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Vessel details can be found in the USS Liberty (AGTR-5) article.
 Help arrives after the Israeli attack on USS Liberty. USS Liberty was an US Navy intelligence ship which was attacked in international waters near the Sinai Peninsula, north of El Arish, by Israeli fighter planes and torpedo boats on June 8, 1967 during the Six-Day War between Israel and the Arab States. In all, 34 American servicemen were killed and 172 wounded in the attack.
Israel maintains, and the US government has formally accepted, that the incident was entirely due to error. Israel contends it was assured by the United States that no US ships were in the area, and that its air and naval forces wrongly identified the Liberty at various stages as a Russian intelligence ship providing information to the Arabs or as the Egyptian vessel "El Quseir," which is a horse carrier one-fourth the size of the Liberty.
The United States and Israel exchanged diplomatic notes after several inquiries, and the US accepted an indemnity of $13 million.
Surviving crew members, as well as a number of Western observers and former US government officials (including then CIA director Richard Helms), and then-Secretary of State Dean Rusk assert that the attack was premeditated and deliberate and that Israel knew the ship was American.
This incident stands as the only peacetime attack on a US naval vessel not investigated by Congress. The survivors want a full Congressional hearing; they hold that a proper investigation has never taken place and that all previous reports are incomplete, mention the incident in passing, and either that they are intended to exonerate Israel or that they do not even question the culpability of the attack (instead, they hold, it focuses on other topics, such as American communication problems). Among the theories presented as to why Israel carried out this action is that Israel may have been trying to get the US involved in the conflict on Israel's side, by convincing the US that Egypt was the aggressor.
 Sailors carry coffins aboard to remove the casualties. Background
USS Liberty (AGTR-5) was originally the 7,725-ton (light) civilian cargo ship Simmons Victory. She was acquired by the United States Navy, converted to an Auxiliary Technical Research Ship (AGTR), and began her first deployment in 1965, to waters off the west coast of Africa. She carried out several more operations during the next two years. During the Six-Day War between Israel and the Arab nations, she was sent to collect electronic intelligence in the eastern Mediterranean.
On June 5, the day before the start of the Six-Day War, Israel asked if the United States had any ships in the region. The United States responded that it did not -- and it didn't, since the United States was just entering the Mediterranean Sea at this time. In addition, five messages had been sent to Liberty warning it to come no closer than 100 miles to the Sinai coast. These messages were not received.
During the day preceding the attack, the ship was flown over by several aircraft. Their exact number and type is disputed; at least one was a Nord Noratlas "flying boxcar" (claimed by the survivors and confirmed by Israel); a photograph presents a C-47 Dakota and other reports speak about Mirage III jet fighters. At least some of those fly-bys were from a close range. In fact, at 6:00 A.M. Sinai (GMT +2) time that morning Israel confirmed that a Nord Noratlas identified the ship as the USS Liberty. Many Liberty crewmen given testimony that one of the aircraft flew so close to Liberty that her propellers rattled the deck plating of the ship and her pilots waved to the crew of the Liberty and her crewmen waved back.
The ship left the coast of Israel in the morning hours of June 8, 1967 and traveled westwards towards the coast of the Sinai Peninsula to monitor the fighting which was taking place. On the afternoon of that day the ship was steaming at about 5 knots (9 km/h) on the boundary of international and coastal waters approximately 13 miles (21 km) off the coast of the Sinai Peninsula near El-Arish.
The Israeli military had standing orders to attack any unidentified vessel near the shore. At about 2 p.m., Liberty was attacked by several aircraft, most probably two or three Mirage IIIs carrying cannon and rockets followed by Dassault Mysteres carrying napalm.
 Liberty turns to evade Israeli torpedo boats. About twenty minutes after the attack of the aircraft, the ship was approached by three torpedo boats bearing Israeli flags and identification signs. Initially, Captain McGonagle, who perceived that the torpedo boats "were approaching the ship in a torpedo launch attitude," (http://www.ussliberty.org/torpedo.htm) ordered a machine gun to engage the boats. After recognizing the Israeli standard and seeing apparent morse code signaling attempts by one of the boats (but being unable to see what was being sent, due to the smoke of the fire started by the earlier aircraft attack), McGonagle gave the order to hold fire. This order was apparently misunderstood in the confusion, and two heavy machine guns opened fire. Subsequently the Israeli boats opened fire and launched two torpedoes at Liberty (five, according to the 1982 IDF History Department report). One hit Liberty on the starboard side, forward of the superstructure, creating a large hole in what had been a former cargo hold converted to the ships research spaces causing the majority of the casualties for the incident. The torpedo boats may have approached Liberty and strafed crewmen (including damage control parties and sailors preparing life rafts for launch) on deck (see below for disputed details).
Eventually the torpedo boats withdrew from the area. The Israelis were afraid at first that they had attacked a Soviet ship, which might bring the Soviet Union into the war. When the ship was confirmed to have been American, the torpedo boats returned to offer help; it was refused by the American ship. About three hours after the attack, Israel informed the US embassy in Tel Aviv about the incident and provided a helicopter to fly a US naval attaché to the ship.
Though severely damaged,with a 50 foot hole and a twisted keel, Liberty's crew kept her afloat, and she was able to leave the area under her own power. She was escorted to Malta by units of the US Sixth Fleet and was there given interim repairs. After these were completed in July 1967, Liberty returned to the United States. She was decommissioned in June 1968 and struck from the Naval Vessel Register. Liberty was transferred to US Maritime Administration (MARAD) in December 1970 and sold for scrap in 1973. Her casualties numbered 34 dead and 171 wounded.
Details in dispute
 Israeli officials said their forces thought they were attacking this ship, the Egyptian vessel El-Quseir. The events surrounding the attack, even very simple elements such as its duration, are a subject of fierce controversy. Among the disputed facts:
- Visibility of ensign: The most vehemently debated point is the visibility of the large American flag that the ship was flying; Americans claimed that it was visible in the wind. The Israeli pilots claimed that they were either unable to notice it altogether (possibly due to there being no wind), or considered it an Egyptian diversion aimed to mislead the pursuers. One point that is beyond dispute is that USS Liberty bore five-foot-high markings along either bow clearly indicating her hull (or "pendant") number (AGTR-5) or the 24 inch high letters spelling the vessel's name across the stern. These marking were not cursive Arabic script, but in English.
- Israeli aircraft markings: American survivors of the attack have made the claim that the Israeli aircraft were unmarked. Israel never responded to that claim specifically, although it is not certain to what extent the people on the ship would be able to notice markings (if present) on the aircraft. Everyday experience spotting low-flying jet aircraft indicates markings are next to impossible to be noted by the casual observer, even on solid ground and during a direct overflight; this difficulty would be likely to increase on a ship and in the rush of the attack.
- Jamming: An additional point on which Israel did not comment is the use of radio jamming. In the absence of reliable records, it is only left to speculate whether jamming (of Navy tactical and international maritime distress frequencies) did take place, or whether the deficiency in communications originated in the attack itself (i.e. loss of power and damage of antennas). Both Liberty and USS Saratoga radio operators reported hearing the distinctive buzzing sound usually indicative of radio frequency jamming
- Probability of identification: Americans claim the closer fly-bys should have been sufficient for identification. Israel acknowledged that the ship had been identified as American and neutral the previous day; however it claims that at 11 a.m., the ship moved out of the status board. An hour later, when explosions were heard in El-Arish, Israel claims to have re-acquired the ship without being aware that it was the same one that was flown over the day before.
- Effort for identification: The American crew claims that the attacking aircraft did not make identification runs over Liberty, but rather began to strafe immediately. One Israeli report claims several passes were made.
- Speed of the vessel: According to Israeli accounts, they made (admittedly erroneous) measurements that indicated that the ship was steaming at 30 knots (56 km/h). United States and Israeli naval doctrine at the time required that a ship traveling at that speed must be presumed to be a warship. Liberty's speed was later recalculated to be 28 knots, although the top speed of the Liberty was only 17.5 knots (21 knots being attainable if the engine governors were disengaged) According to Body of Secrets, by James Bamford, and Liberty crewmen (including the Officer-of-the-Deck) the ship was steaming at 5 knots at the time of the attack.
- Call for ID: Israel claims to have called the ship on radio several times without receiving an answer while the Americans deny ever receiving a call for identification.
- Visual communications: Joe Meadors, then the signalman on bridge, states that "Immediately prior to the torpedo attack I was on the Signal Bridge repeatedly sending 'USS Liberty US Navy Ship' by flashing light to the torpedo boats." However the Israeli boats claim to have read only the signal "AA", which was exactly the signal dispatched by the Egyptian destroyer Ibrahim Al-Awal when it was engaged by the Israeli navy eleven years earlier. Meadors claims that he never sent "AA" (which would require him to identify himself as well); this disagreement may be settled by considering the fact that Liberty was unable to read signals sent from the boats.
- Israeli ships' actions after the torpedo hit: The American crew claims that after Liberty had been torpedoed, Israeli boats circled the ship shooting at descended (unmanned) life rafts and sailors on board the ship. Israelis claim that they suddenly recognized the ship as American almost immediately after it was hit and ceased fire. The former point of view was expressed by many of the crew members, while the latter one is reinforced by the statement the ship's captain had given to the Navy Court several days after the attack.
- Israeli offers of help: Reports differ regarding whether the Israeli boats offered help. The crew claims that the torpedo boats simply withdrew, while the captain and the Israeli crew report that help was offered; the captain stated that he had asked the Israeli boats to stay away by the means of signal flags.
- U.S. rescue attempts: It seems that at least two rescue attempts were launched from US aircraft carriers nearby; the reason why they did not reach their objective, as well as details of communications between US forces in the area and the White House, are generally unknown and only further complicate this enigmatic affair.
Subsequent inquiry
Three subsequent Israeli reports concluded that the attack was conducted because Liberty was confused with an Egyptian vessel and because of failures of communications between Israel and the US. The three Israeli commissions were:
- Ram Ron Investigation
- Israeli Examining Judges Investigation
- IDF History Department Investigation
 Torpedo damage to Liberty's research compartment (Starboard side). The Israeli government admitted that three crucial errors were made: the refreshing of the status board (nullifying the ship's classification as American), the erroneous identification of the ship as an Egyptian vessel, and the lack of notification from the returning aircraft informing Israeli headquarters of markings on the front of the hull (markings that would not be found on an Egyptian ship). As the general root of these problems, Israel blames the combination of alarm and tiredness experienced by the Israeli troops at that point of the war.
On December 17, 1987, the issue was officially closed by the exchange of diplomatic notes between the US and Israel. Israel also eventually paid nearly US $13 million in humanitarian reparations to the United States and in compensation to the families of the victims.
Controversy
Israel denied any accusations that the attack was deliberate due to the following arguments:
- The attacking aircraft used napalm and machine guns, rather ineffective armament for attacking a ship.
- Liberty opened fire first on the gunboats.
- Due to the aircraft attack, Liberty was covered with smoke and was unable to conduct visual communications in any way.
- No adequate benefit has been put forward that the Israelis would derive from the attack on an American ship, especially considering the high cost of the predictable complications that must inevitably follow such an attack on a powerful ally.
 Aircraft pelted the superstructure with machine-gun fire. At least some of the survivors of Liberty have often claimed that the attack was premeditated. In particular, Jim Ennes, a junior officer (and off-going Officer of the Deck) on Liberty's bridge at the time of the attack, has published a book titled "Assault on the Liberty". Like virtually all accounts of the "Liberty" incident, it has come under heavy criticism by those disagreeing with its point of view.
Ennes and Joe Meadors, another survivor of the attack, run a web site that was built "with support and encouragement from the USS Liberty Veterans Association." Meadors states that the classification of the attack as deliberate is the official policy of the association, to which all known survivors belong. Other survivors run several additional websites.
Several books and a BBC documentary tried to prove that USS Liberty was attacked on purpose. They are backed in this position by some representatives of the US intelligence community. Critics claim that many of them include incorrect assumptions and use fuzzy reasoning. For example, they claim that the ship was attacked to prevent the U.S. from knowing about the forthcoming attack in the Golan Heights. When evaluating the merits of this theory, one must balance Israel's need to keep a possible war crime secret, versus the probably more serious consequences of attacking an ally.
Israeli officials and Jewish organizations world-wide have complained that these materials are often used as a pretext for anti-Semitic declarations and acts. They claim that these reviews often do not give Israel the benefit of the doubt, turning this extremely ambiguous history into a circus for Israel-bashing. Meadors and Ennes have denied an anti-Semitic pretext in their work, and have repeatedly expressed sharp disapproval at the use of the USS Liberty incident in anti-Semitic contexts.
For years some people have claimed that audio tapes existed of the Israeli pilots identifying the ship as American before they attacked. There are other conspiracy claims that the Liberty radio compartment made such interceptions and that the U.S. submarine Amberjack had gathered damning evidence during the attack by means of its periscope camera.
On July 2, 2003, as a result of US Florida Judge Jay Cristol lawsuit using the Freedom of Information Act, the National Security Agency made two significant admissions: that there had been no radio intercepts made by USS Liberty, and that there had been no radio intercepts made by the US submarine Amberjack. The National Security Agency released copies of the recordings it made from an EC-121 aircraft in the vicinity of the attacks during the time periods 2:30 p.m. Sinai time to 3:27 p.m. Sinai time. The NSA tapes were the last significant piece of evidence which remained classified until the decison. The English translations of those tapes are published in Appendix 2, of Judge Cristol's book "The Liberty Incident". The tapes show that the helicopters were first dispatched to rescue Egyptians, and then demonstrate the confusion as to the identification of the target ship. Cristol adds: "The tapes confirm that the helicopter pilot observed the flag at 3:12 p.m." which would coincide with the audio tapes which the Israel Air Force released to Judge Cristol of the radio transmissions before, during and after the attack.
On October 10, 2003, the Jerusalem Post ran an interview with Yiftah Spector, one of the pilots who participated in the attack[1] (http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1065773796483). Spector stated in the interview that the ship was assumed to be Egyptian at the time of the attack.
Since the attack on the USS Liberty ten official U.S. investigations and 3 or more official Israeli investigations have concluded that the tragic event was a case of mistaken identity. [2] (http://www.israelnewsagency.com/usslibertyisrael10034.html)However, critics of the Israeli government position state that for the three Israeli investigations, the fact that the attack was a mistake was a given, and that the investigations were to decide whether or not anyone in the Israeli Defense Forces should be tried on crimes (no wrongdoing was found). They also assert that five U.S. congressional investigations and four other U.S. investigations were not investigations at all, but rather reports, using evidence only from the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry. As well, they insist that the majority of those nine U.S. reports have nothing to do with the culpability of the attack, but rather, they discuss issues such as communications failures.[3] (http://www.wrmea.com/archives/December_2003/0312014.html)
In their view, the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry is the only investigation on the incident to date. They claim that it was hastily conducted, in only 10 days, even though the court’s president, Rear Admiral Isaac Kidd, said that it would take 6 months to properly conduct. Furthermore, the court's legal counsel has stepped forward and stated that Washington ordered him and Kidd to falsely report that the attack was a mistake, and his statement says that he and Kidd believed that the attack was deliberate.
 Commander W.L. McGonagle in his damaged cabin after the attack. See also
Books
External links
- The official website of the Veterans of USS Liberty (http://www.ussliberty.com)
- NSA - Reports and Audio Recordings with transcripts (http://www.nsa.gov/liberty/index.cfm)
- (NSA) Memos show Liberty attack was an error (http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=315949&contrassID=2&subContrassID=1&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y)
- Jewish Virtual Library article on the incident (http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/History/liberty.html)
- Additional information released by the National Security Agency on July 2003 (http://www.nsa.gov/liberty/), including audio recordings (mostly in Hebrew), their transcripts (in English), follow-up reports, and a report originally released in 1999.
- Pages devoted to USS Liberty Incident (http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/History/libertytoc.html) maintained by the American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, including a collection of contemporaneous diplomatic documents and telegrams.
- Casualty list of the USS Liberty (http://www.ussliberty.org/casualty.htm)
- Possible strategic and political backgrounds (http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig/margolis12.html) by Eric Margolis, foreign correspondent for the Toronto Sun.
- The 'USS Liberty': Case Closed (http://www.shalem.org.il/azure/9-Oren.htm) by Israeli historian Michael Oren
- Assault on Liberty Still Covered Up After 26 Years (http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/0693/9306019.htm) at Washington-Report
- Affidavit by Ward Boston (http://www.ifamericansknew.org/history/boston.html), senior legal counsel of the Navy's inquiry, that Johnson and McNamara ordered a conclusion of mistaken identity despite "overwhelming evidence to the contrary"
- Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Israel Deliberately Attacked US Ship (http://www.thememoryhole.org/war/moorer-liberty.htm), originally appeared in Houston Chronicle, 09 Jan 2004
- San Diego Union-Tribune: Lifting the "fog of war" (http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20040328/news_mz1e29libert.html)
- Naval Institute Proceedings: Friendless Fire? (http://www.usni.org/proceedings/Articles03/PROwalsh06.htm)
- USS 'Liberty' hit was unintentional, says CIA (http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/Printer&cid=1073881745637)
- Pilot who bombed 'Liberty' talks to 'Post (http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1065773796483) - interview with pilot (Yiftah Spector) who led attack
- Exclusive: Liberty attack tapes revealed (http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1086230742987) - transcript of IAF recordings of radio traffic during the attack.
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